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APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF -y-
1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
2 On June 3, 2012, Ms. Suzana Connor ("Suzana") was arrested for felony drunk driving 
3 and her bail was set the next day at $50,000. CR. Vol. l, p. 98. It was her third charge of felony 
4 DUI. CR. Vol. 1, p. 2. Suzana was issued bail by Big Dawg Bail Bonds ("Big Dawg") on July 14, 
5 2012, in the full amount of$50,000 and was released. ld. 
6 Suzana had appeared at all of her court proceedings until on January 15, 2013. CR Vol. 1, 
7 p. 99. Upon her nonappearance, the court forfeited her bond and entered the failure to appear in 
8 the court minutes. ld. The bench warrant was not signed and issued until January 24. ld. 
9 On January 10, Kevin Elliott ("Mr. Elliott"), manager of Big Dawg Bail Bonds, received 
10 infonnation from Suzana's mother that indicated Suzana may abscond before her April 15 
11 appearance in court. ld. Mr. Elliott promptly investigated the matter and observed Suzana's 
12 movements. ld. 
13 Mr. Elliott is experienced in investigating these matters and in his professional opinion, he 
14 believed that Suzana was not going to abscond. CR Vol. 1, pp. 99-100. In other instances he had 
15 people call him to make false implications of the defendant absconding in an effort to provoke 
16 him into arresting and surrendering the defendant. ld. 
17 Big Dawg, similar to other bail bond companies, will arrest the defendant to surrender to 
18 the sheriff if they believe the defendant is likely to abscond or not cooperate in appearing in court. 
19 TR. March 5,2013. p. 32, fl. 9-16. By properly surrendering the defendant before the time set for 
20 appearance, the bond is exonerated. ld. 
21 On January 15, Mr. Elliott was "95 percent positive" he could have brought Suzana in had 
22 a warrant been issued that day because he had her in his sight. TR. March 5, 2013. p. 20, l. 18. 
23 However, the warrant was not signed and issued until January 24. TR. FebruCllY 19, 2013, p. 9, fl. 
24 21-22. 
25 Due to no active warrant being issued, Big Dawg could not legally arrest her that day. TR. 
26 March 5, 2013, p. 25, fl. 15-16. It was not until January 31 that the Sheriff received the warrant. 
27 TR. March 26,2013, p. 73, fl. 14-19. The parties stipulated to the fact that it is the Ada County 
28 Sheriff s policy to not accept the surrender of a defendant if the Sheriff does not have the warrant 
1 
1 as active in his computer system. TR. March 26, 2013, p. 73, ll. 14-19. 
2 Mr. Elliott had been reprimanded by the Ada County Sheriff for arresting a defendant 
3 after a bond had been forfeited but before the warrant was active in the Sheriff's system, and he 
4 was informed that to do so was considered by the sheriff to be kidnapping. CR. Vol L p. 101. 
5 On January 28, Mr. Elliott received notification that the bond had been forfeited. TR. 
6 March 5,2013, p. 21, ll. 1-2. The notice of warrant was not delivered to the Sherriff until January 
7 31. C"R. Vol L p. 101. Despite exhaustive attempts to locate Suzana since Mr. Elliott's last 
8 opportunity to arrest her when he saw her car on January 28th, they have been unable to locate 
9 her. CR. VolI,p. 114-115. 
10 Mr. Elliott made every effort to locate and arrest the defendant in this case. ld. Many of 
11 his efforts were moot before January 31 because there was no warrant signed by the judge and 
12 there was no active warrant in the sheriff's system. Future efforts were also moot, as Suzana had 
13 already absconded and has presumably fled far away from the area, likely to India. CR. Vol. L p. 
14 111. 
15 In response to Big Dawg's motion to fully exonerate bail, the District COUli partially 
16 exonerated the bail in the amount of $29,000. CR. Vol L p. 116. Big Dawg filed their Notice of 
17 Appeal on October 7,2013. CR. Vol L p. 119. The matter is now before this Court. 






Did the District Court "immediately" order the forfeiture of bond and issue a bench 
warrant for defendant's arrest pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2915(1)? 
Did the state breach its contract with Big Dawg by not complying with existing law that 
constituted express contingency terms of their agreement? 
Did the District Court abuse their discretion in applying the I.C.R. 46(h) factors to 
24 determine ifbail should be exonerated? 
25 ARGUMENT 
26 The bail bond system serves as a vital mechanism to ensure that defendants will appear in 
27 court. Bail bondsmen play an intricate role in ensuring the cooperation of these defendants by 
28 taking the risk of posting their bail and subsequently following up to make sure these defendants 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 2 -
1 cooperate in further court proceedings. To counterbalance these interests, a contract is created 
2 between the bondsmen and the state, with both sides carrying risk to procure the defendant's 
3 cooperation. 
4 The statute at issue in this case provides strict guidelines to foster the cooperation of the 
5 defendant and for the court to immediately take steps that notify the bondsmen when they may 
6 legally enforce their right to compel cooperation through an'est. I.C. § 19-2915. 
7 The timeliness of the court in complying with Idaho Code § 19-2915 is of the utmost 
8 importance, as bondsmen rely on fonnulaic application ofthe statute by the court to operate their 
9 businesses in accordance with the law. Without strict adherence to the statute in immediately 
10 complying with the tenns ofIdaho Code § 19-2915(1), the bondsmen stand to lose their 
11 investment and the state stands to lose its interest in procuring the defendant's cooperation. 
12 Simply stated, the District Court failed to immediately issue a warrant after the bond had 
13 been forfeited, thus breaching their contract with Big Dawg. Albeit the court's deviation from the 
14 statutes mandate was likely inadvertent and a clerical oversight, it was nonetheless an oversight 
15 that is statutorily impennissible. The Ada County Sheriff s policy of not honoring a legitimate 
16 warrant until it is active in their own system is equally disruptive. These oversights prejudiced 
17 Big Dawg considerably and made perfonnance by Big Dawg impossible in their obligation to 
18 procure Suzana Connor. 
19 Further, Mr. Elliott relentlessly pursued Suzana to the full extent of the law and upheld his 
20 end of the contract with the state. The state claims that Mr. Elliott could have taken additional 
21 precautions to bring in Suzana into court, namely that he should have checked to make sure she 
22 appeared in court. However, even if Mr. Elliott had done so, he would not have been able to 
23 legally arrest Suzana until a warrant was signed and active in the sheriffs system. Mr. Elliott still 
24 pursued Suzana but his hands were completely tied until the warrant went active on January 31 
25 and at that time, she had absconded and Mr. Elliott's chance to apprehend her had dissipated. 
26 Because Mr. Elliott could not make the warrant active, he was literally left without recourse until 
27 an active warrant arrived at the sheriff s office. 
28 For the reasons set forth below, Big Dawg respectfully requests that this Court correct the 
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1 oversight and breach of contract by fully exonerating the $50,000 bond. Alternatively, Big Dawg 
2 requests a partial exoneration that exceeds the $29,000 amount awarded by the District Court. 
3 I. STANDARD OFREVIE\V 
4 This case comes before the Court as a matter involving statutory interpretation as to 
5 whether the district court met its statutory obligations after forfeiting bail. Such statutory 
6 interpretations are reviewed freely by this Court and begins with the literal words. Thomson v. 
7 City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 478 (2002). Because matters of statutory construction are purely 
8 questions oflaw, they are reviewed de novo. State, Dep't of Fin. v. Res. Serv., Co., 130 Idaho 877, 
9 880 (1997). 
10 Concerning contracts, the Court exercises free review over the interpretation of clear and 
11 unambiguous contracts. City ofChubbuckv. City of Pocatello , 127 Idaho 198,201 (1994). 
12 Finally, when a district court applies law to the facts in a case, that application oflaw is also 
13 reviewed de novo. Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 679 (2009). 
14 If contract law does not apply to the bail bond exoneration, the decision to exonerate bail 
15 is in the discretion of the district court. State v. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 651 
16 (CLApp.2007). To determine if a court abused its discretion, three factors are considered in 
17 determining if the court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the 
18 outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3) 
19 reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. 
20 n. IDAHO CODE § 19-2915 CLEARLY MANDATES THAT A COURT MUST 
21 IMMEDIATELY ENTER A DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO APPEAR IN THE 
22 MINUTES, ORDER FORFEITURE OF BAIL, AND ISSUE A BENCH WARRANT 
23 FOR ARREST 
24 The purpose of the Idaho Bail Act is to create a predictable set of standards that enables 
25 the bail system to work properly and sate its essential purpose of ensuring the appearance of 
26 defendants in court. I.C. § 19-2902. Indeed, this fundamental notion is prominently displayed in 
27 the Statement of Policy in the Idaho Bail Act: 
28 





























"The purpose of this chapter is to provide a uniform and comprehensive statewide 
process for the administration of bail in criminal cases ... " Idaho Code § 19-
2902(2) (emphasis added). 
Without adhering to a thorough and formulaic process, serious liberties would be 
jeopardized for all parties involved. Though meticulous compliance with the standards may seem 
peripherally arduous, it is necessary to protect the foregoing interests. 
First and foremost, the defendant has a constitutional right to bail in criminal cases under 
Idaho's Constitution, Article I § 6. Bail enables the defendant to be released from jail and move 
forward with court proceedings, frec from being detained so long as they cooperate, until an 
ultimate finding of guilt or innocence is rendered. I.C.R. 46(a). 
To arrest the defendant after a failure to appear, there must be an active warrant out for the 
defendant or else the arrestee runs the risk of falsely detaining the defendant and being charged 
with kidnapping. It becomes readily apparent from this system that without scrupulous oversight 
and predictable communication, the defendant is at risk ofbeing illegally detained and the 
bondsman runs the risk of being charged for illegal detainment. 
The issuance of bail also serves to ensure the attendance of the defendant in future court 
proceedings. I.C. § 19-2902(2)(a). Often bail bondsmen end up posting the bond set by the court 
instead ofthe defendant and thus bear significant risk of the defendant absconding because they 
may end up stuck paying the cost of the bond. If the bondsmen fears the defendant may abscond 
and not participate in future court proceedings, they may dissolve the risk by arresting the 
defendant and surrendering them to the sheriff to exonerate their bond. I.C. § 19-2922(4). 
While the risk is in place partially to require the bondsmen to remain alert in ensuring the 
defendant's cooperation, the court must also be careful to uphold their end of the bargain. 
Without the court meticulously and contemporaneously following the guidelines set forth in 
Idaho Bail Act, specifically Idaho Code § 19-2915, the vital interest of ensuring the defendant's 
cooperation may often be squandered due to a lack of oversight. More importantly, bondsmen 
may be inclined to prematurely surrender a defendant ifthey cannot rely on the court to 
immediately follow through on the requirements of Idaho Code § 19-2915 or even worse, they 
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1 might continue to miss their window of opportunity to procure the defendant after the bond is 
2 forfeited. In either scenario, the bondsman's business is hampered and his profitability is 
3 jeopardized. 
4 A. The word "immediately" in Idaho Code § 19-2915(1) requires the court to 
5 contemporaneously record a failure to appear in the minutes, order forfeiture of a 
6 bail, and issue a bench warrant because the common meaning of "immediate" 
7 canotes urgency and is not ambiguous. 
8 It is a principle canon of statutory construction to apply the ordinary meaning to 
9 the words in a statute if the word is not defined. E.g. McLean v. Maverick Country 
10 Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813 (2006). \Vords must be given their usual, ordinary, and 
11 plain meaning. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827 (2001). Where a statute is unambiguous, the 
12 intent of the legislature is given effect without the court engaging in statutory 
13 construction. I.C. § 73-113(1); see also Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 
14 Idaho 663 (1987) (stating that if the statute does not contain any ambiguity, the Court 
15 must follow the law as written and not attempt to construe its meaning). 
16 The language of Idaho Code § 19-2915(1) states that if a defendant fails to 
17 appear before the court, the court "shall immediately: (a) Enter the defendant's failure to 
18 appear in the minutes; (b) Order the forfeiture of bail; and ( c) Issue a bench warrant for 
19 the arrest of the defendant." (emphasis added). 
20 The importance of giving effect to the meaning of the plain and ordinary language 
21 of Idaho Code § 19-2915(1) is especially paramount here because authoritative case law 
22 in Idaho relating to the timing of ordering forfeiture and recording a nonappearance is 
23 non-existent. 
24 The ordinary meaning is often analyzed in the context of dictionary definitions 
25 that are used daily. According to Merriam-\Vebster, "immediately" is a British root word 
26 meaning "with no person or thing in between ... without any delay." Alerriam-Webster 
27 Dictionary (emphasis added). Identically, the full modern definition is listed as "without 
28 interval of time." Id. The common definition of "immediately" in every sense elicits 
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1 urgency and with no intervening events or lapse of time. 
2 In the context of arrest and arraignment, this Court has repeatedly interpreted the 
3 phrase "without unnecessary delay" to mean that a defendant must be arraigned within a 
4 matter of hours, not days, excepting weekends. See Idaho Code § 19-615; State v. 
5 Knapp, 120 Idaho 343 (1991). The word "immediately" is even more restrictive than 
6 "without unnecessary delay." Because Idaho Code § 19-615 is interpreted to mean 
7 within one business day, it seems reasonable that the more restrictive word 
8 "immediately" should be interpreted to mean "before the close of that business day" at a 
9 bare minimum. 
10 Further, the ordinary meaning of "immediately" in every day conversation also 
11 has a similar understanding. If a husband tells his wife that he will "immediately" take 
12 out the trash, his wife would not expect any intervening tasks to be performed by the 
13 husband. 
14 Concededly, these definitions and usages must be met with practical realities per 
15 the overall context. If one says they will "immediately" build a bridge, context would 
16 indicate that the steps would be taken to build a bridge immediately, not that the bridge 
17 would be completed immediately. Conversely, if one states they will "immediately" put 
18 on a shirt, context would indicate that the shirt would indeed be put on with almost no 
19 lapse of time. 
20 In the instant case, the immediate notification of bond forfeiture and warrant 
21 issuance is much more akin to putting on a shirt or immediately taking out the trash, 
22 although the consequences stemming from the timeliness are much more dire. Albeit that 
23 the District Court performs many clerical tasks daily that stem from court decisions, the 
24 legislature purposefully stated that these specific tasks must be done "immediately." In 
25 fact, it is common for the judge to sign the warrant the day of the nonappearance and 
26 have it delivered to the sheriff within a couple days. Such an explicit command was 
27 presumably specific to prioritize the tasks in Idaho Code § 19-2915(1) in order to fulfill 
28 the states' end of the bargain with bondsmen by alerting them of the defendant's 
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nonappearance so the bondsmen can more readily locate the defendant. 
2 Further, the legislature had to opportunity to give a more lenient time frame to the 
3 courts in Idaho Code § 19-2915(1). Courts regularly attach a "reasonable" standard time 
4 frame to complete statutory mandates. Had the legislature struck "immediate" and 
5 instead said "reasonable" in Idaho Code § 19-2915(1), the confines of this case would 
6 become gray and an entirely justifiable debate would ensue as to what "reasonable" is 
7 under the statute. However, statutory construction, as codified in Idaho Code § 73-113, 
8 dictates that a court is to assume that the legislature meant the precise words it said 
9 unless that word is given a specific or peculiar meaning by definition. See I.C. § 73-
10 113(1) (stating that "[t]he literal words of a statute are the best guide to determining 
11 legislative intent"). As demonstrated above, "immediate" has a clear meaning here and 
12 we must assume the legislature intentionally used that word instead of reasonable, or 
13 some other standard. 
14 Further demonstrating the legislatures intention in making Idaho Code § 19-
15 2915(1) is that in the very next subsection, a five-day time limit is set for the court to 
16 send notice of bail forfeiture to the issuer of the bond. I.C. § 19-2915(2). The legislature 
17 set an "immediate" standard for subsection (1), yet gave a more lenient five-day 
18 limitation on sending notice of bail forfeiture. 
19 In sum, the legislature gave a clear and unambiguous mandate for the courts to 
20 forfeit the bail and issue a warrant before performing any other task because the word 
21 "immediate" means that there is to be no intervening activity and the literal words of the 
22 legislature are clear. 
23 B. The court must immediately comply with all three requirements of Idaho Code § 
24 19-2915(1) because the clause is written in the conjunctive 
25 Having established that the District Court had a statutory obligation to immediately act 
26 pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2915(1), it bears mentioning that the requirement for immediacy 
27 applies equally to all three requirements with equal weight. I.C. § 19-2915(1)(a)-(c). 
28 It is a standard statutory interpretation to give words separate meaning when used 
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conjunctively in the same clause of a statute, unless context strongly suggests otherwise. Filer 
2 Mut. Telephone Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 76 Idaho 256, 258 (1955). 
3 Idaho Code § 19-2915(1) requires the "immediate" modifier preceding the conjunctive 
4 requirements to apply to each requirement individually because there is no context suggesting that 
5 was not the intent. Seeing as how the intent was to create a uniform and predictable bond 
6 forfeiture system that procures defendant cooperation, applying the common canon of 
7 construction regarding conjunctive phrases in statutes promotes the intent because requiring each 
8 immediate action as to each requirement is predictable and more likely to bring the defendant into 
9 court. 
10 C. The issuance of the warrant and the subseqent delivery of the warrant to the 
11 sherrif were not immediate 
12 Since immediacy is required by Idaho Code § 19-2915(1) in the conjunctive, the court 
13 failed to meet the mandate set forth by the statute, namely the immediate issuance of a warrant. 
14 And although the warrant was signed on January 24, the warrant did not reach the Ada County 
15 Sheriffs system until January 31. 
16 However, even if we simply look at the signing of the warrant on the 24th, the eight-day 
17 lapse between the nonappearance and the signing of the warrant were anything but "immediate." 
18 In fact, it is unequivocally late. Then considering that the bond was forfeited on the 15th and the 
19 warrant did not reach the sheriff until the 31 S\ there was a 15-day window where Mr. Elliott could 
20 not legally arrest the defendant and perform his portion ofthe contract. 
21 Even if the Court is to look at the date when notification of bond forfeiture was sent by 
22 District Court on the 24th, which technically complies with by Idaho Code § 19-2915(2), Big 
23 Dawg did not receive actually receive the notice until the 28th. There was still a six day window 
24 between the day the notice was sent and the day when the warrant reached the sheriff. As 
25 described in the statement of the case, Mr. Elliott had the defendant's precise location pinned 
26 down in the time frame when the warrant should have been active. 
27 Had the warrant been active, Mr. Elliott could have arrested the defendant and surrendered 
28 her to the Ada County Sheriff, thus fully exonerating the bond by statute. I.C. § 19-2922(4). 
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However, Mr. Elliott lost that opportunity because the warrant was not immediately issued. In 
2 fact, this was not even in a reasonable time given the consequences at stake. The warrant was 
3 undisputedly late by arriving on the 31 st and negated Big Dawg's ability to arrest and surrender 
4 the defendant. 
5 It is not common practice within the bail bond industry to hover around the court docket to 
6 ensure a defendant's appearance in cOUli. There is a reasonable reliance placed upon the court to 
7 uphold the statute in order for bondsmen to perfonn their end of the contract. 
8 III. BY FAILING TO ADHERE TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF IDAHO CODE § 19-
9 2915(1), THE COURT BREACHED ITS SURETY CONTRACT \VITH BIG DA WG 
10 BY VIOLATING UNAMBIGUOUS, EXPRESS TERMS 
11 In this case, the state did not abide by the tenns proscribed by Idaho Code § 19-2915(1). 
12 Because Idaho Code § 19-2915(1) was existing law that constituted tenns ofthe contract that was 
13 entered between the state and Big Dawg in 2012, the state violated the tenns of the contract by 
14 not immediately ordering the forfeiture of bail and issuing a bench warrant for the arrest of 
15 Suzana. Thus, the contract was breached. 
16 As a result of this breach, Big Dawg has suffered damages, namely the $50,000 bond not 
17 being exonerated and the expense and effort incurred in a continuing search for Suzana that 
18 would not have been required if Big Dawg had the tools to arrest her immediately subsequent to 
19 her nonappearance. 
20 A. The breach of contract occurred when the Court violated sections of Idaho Code § 
21 19-2915(1), which are express terms of the contract because Idaho Code § 19-
22 2915(1) was existing law at the time 
23 In Idaho, a bail bond agreement between the state and a bail bond service creates a surety 
24 contract between the state on one side and the surety on the other. State v. Abracadabra Bail 
25 Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 116 (1998). Because it is a surety contract, existing law becomes tenns 
26 that are read into the contract as if they were express. ld. Therefore, if either party does not abide 
27 by existing law, a breach of contract occurs. 
28 As demonstrated supra, the term "immediate" is not ambiguous and applies to each 
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1 subsection of Idaho Code § 19-2915(1). Because the Idaho Bail Act was existing law at the time 
2 Big Dawg and the state entered into their contract, Idaho Code § 19-2915(1 )-(3) became clear 
3 and unambiguous terms of their contract under the Abracadabra rule. 
4 The state thus breached their contract with Big Dawg because they did not abide by the 
5 unambiguous term to "immediately" issue a warrant. By necessity, this term is contingency in 
6 nature because without action by a court first, any future action by the bondsman is impossible. 
7 This breach was material because due to the delay, Big Dawg could not perform their end of the 
8 contract. The breach directly caused the damage because had the warrant been issued 
9 immediately, Mr. Elliott is positive that he would have detained the defendant for arrest and 
10 surrendered her to the sheriff. However, it was untimely issued and now Big Dawg has been 
11 disallowed recovery of the full bail amount. Thus, a material breach by the state occurred that 
12 directly caused monetary damages to Big Dawg. 
13 B. Contractual disputes should first be resolved with contract remedies if possible 
14 The nature ofthe surety contract in a bail bond agreement means that the laws of contract 
15 and surety apply. State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 116 (1998). When a dispute 
16 arises that is contractual in nature, contract remedies are the remedy available to the prevailing 
17 party. Id. 
18 Abracadabra dealt squarely with defining the nature of a bail bond dispute and clearly 
19 affirmed it as a contractual dispute in which contract law applies. Oddly, the Abracadabra court 
20 then proceeded to apply the bail forfeiture code at the time and I.C.R. 46, which codified the so 
21 called "Fry factors" that guide bail exonerations. ld. at 116-17, citing State v. Fry, 128 Idaho 50, 
22 54, (Ct.App.1994). However, the Court in Abracadabra dealt with an issue of contempt, which 
23 has no contractual remedy. That is not the case here. Thus, to not apply contract remedies 
24 pursuant to contract law would ostensibly overturn portions of Abracadabra. 
25 If contract law is to be applied to a contract, that analysis includes contract remedies if 
26 possible. To apply contract principles but preclude contract remedies is in complete dissonance 
27 with logic when the matter squarely deals with a contract breach that has a contract remedy. 
28 While the Idaho Criminal Rules and the current bail forfeiture provisions in Idaho Code § 19-
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1 2922 fill in the blanks when the dispute has no contract dispute, they should not have application 
2 to a dispute that has its roots completely in contract principles and has a contract remedy. 
3 C. Performance by Big Dawg was impossible because the District Court did not 
4 immediately issue a warrant, which made it impossible to arrest the defendant 
5 When there is impossibility of performance, contract law dictates that the non-breaching 
6 party is excused from performance by cancelling the contract. Kessler v. Tortoise Dev., Inc., 130 
7 Idaho 105, 108 (1997). Impossibility of performance exists when: (1) a contingency occurs; (2) 
8 the nonoccun-ence of which was a basic assumption of the agreement, and; (3) the contingency 
9 made performance of the agreement literally impossible and frustrated the purpose of the 
10 contract. State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 523 (2008). 
11 The delay by the District Court in issuing an active wan-ant made performance by Big 
12 Dawg in apprehending the defendant impossible because he literally could not an-est her before 
13 January 31 without committing a crime. First, a contingency occun-ed when Mr. Elliott could only 
14 arrest the defendant in fulfillment of the contract if a wan-ant was active. The issuance of a 
15 wan-ant was not within Big Dawg's control and their performance in apprehending the defendant 
16 is contingent upon a wan-ant being issued after the nonappearance. 
17 Second, as explained supra, the "immediate" language of the Idaho Code § 19-2915(1) is 
18 an express term ofthe contract between Big Dawg and the state. It is a basic assumption of the 
19 parties that in order for Big Dawg to uphold their end of the contract, there must be an immediate 
20 compliance with the statute. Big Dawg relied on the District Court to immediately issue a wan-ant 
21 in order to perfonn and assumed the contingency of a wan-ant being issued would not occur. 
22 Third, the contingency of issuing the wan-ant not occurring made performance literally 
23 impossible and frustrated the essential purpose of the contract. The point of a bail bond contract 
24 between the state and the bondsmen is to ensure the appearance and cooperation of the defendant 
25 in court. Idaho Code § 19-2915(1) serves to compel the courts to immediately act in order for the 
26 bondsmen to become alert that they may enforce their right of an-est. By breaching this express 
27 term, the purpose ofthe contract was defeated. 
28 Thus, all elements of impossibility of performance are satisfied and the proper contract 
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1 remedy must be accordingly administered. 
2 D. The proper contractual remedy in this case is rescission and restitution because 
3 there was a material breach of an express term that defeated the purpose of the 
4 contract between Big Dawg and the state 
5 Since contractual disputes should be resolved with contractual remedies when possible, 
6 the proper remedy here is for rescission of the contract between Big Dawg and the state, with full 
7 exoneration of the bond amount. 
8 Contract law allows for rescission of a contract when a material tenn is breached by one 
9 party. Mountain Restaurant Corp. v. ParkCenter Mall Assoc., 122 Idaho 261, 265 (Ct.App.1992). 
10 A material breach occurs when a party deviates from a substantial tenn or tenns in the contract 
11 that it defeats the purpose of the contract and affects the substantive rights of a party. Crowley v. 
12 LaFayette Life Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 818, 821 (1984). 
13 The state materially breached its contract with Big Dawg because the delay in the time of 
14 nonappearance of the defendant and the issuance of the warrant substantially deviated from the 
15 tenn "immediate" that it defeated the purpose of procuring the defendant's cooperation. The Ada 
16 County Sheriff s policy of refusing to enforce warrants that are not active in their system is also a 
17 material breach. These substantial deviations affected Big Dawg's substantive right of having the 
18 bond exonerated and receiving their money back. Had the warrant been immediately signed and 
19 active, Big Dawg could have procured the appearance of the defendant in fulfillment of their 
20 contract with the state. 
21 Rescission of the contract is available because there has been a material breach. If a party 
22 has already paid in the contract being rescinded, they are also entitled to restitution of the amount 
23 paid if it would be unjust for the breaching party to keep the money of the nonbreaching party. 
24 Powell v. Niettman, 116 Idaho 590, 604 (1989). 
25 Although rescission and restitution may ultimately render the same result as when 
26 applying the I.C.R. 46(h) factors, it is not guaranteed. Here, restitution would be in the full 
27 amount of the bail bond, whereas the District Court reached partial exoneration following LC.R. 
28 46(h). 
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1 Regardless of the end result, the proper remedy should be applied to the proper underlying 
2 nature ofthe claim. To apply factors from the Idaho Criminal Rules when the issue is contractual 
3 makes little sense. Here, the conflict is purely contractual and applying contract remedies is 
4 proper because there are contract remedies available in rescission and restitution. 
5 IV. EVEN IF I.C.R. 46(h) IS THE ONLY REMEDY TO EXONERATE BAIL, THE 
6 DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN PROPERLY WEIGHING THE FACTORS 
7 Big Dawg has in good faith expended considerable effort, time, and expense in order to 
8 procure the availability ofthe defendant despite being disadvantaged by the aforementioned 
9 delay. To refuse exoneration of the bail for Big Dawg would not only be patently unfair on an 
10 individual level, but it would violate the statutory guidelines set forth by LC.R. 46(h). 
11 Further, to not exonerate the bond would invite future lapses in oversight by the courts in 
12 complying with Idaho Code § 19-2915(1) and shake the confidence of bondsmen in the 
13 foundation of the bail bond system. If courts continually fail to immediately issue warrants on 
14 bond forfeitures and take the proper steps to timely notify them in accord with Idaho Code § 19-
15 2915(1), bondsmen may resort to imp ennis sible self-help in lieu of a predictable reporting 
16 system. 
17 Such injustice that could be caused by a fragmented system may be avoided by enforcing 
18 the literal language of the statute and by a proper weighing of the factors applicable to bond 
19 exonerations. 
20 A. The District Court erred on their dispositive reliance of I.C.R. 46(h) factors because 
21 of the quasi-contractual nature of the relationship between Big Dawg and the state 
22 Because between the state and bail bond companies is quasi-contractual, the District Court 
23 should not have solely relied of I.C.R. 46(h) to decide the case. As explained above, contractual 
24 disputes are resolved with contract remedies. State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho at 116. 
25 However, the foregoing will explain that even if 46(h) is dispositive in assessing 
26 exoneration of the bail bond, the factors still dictate a full exoneration. Because the District Court 
27 abused its discretion and justice requires full exoneration, the end result should effectively be the 
28 same even ifLC.R. 46(h) is applied. 





























B. The District Court abused its discretion in weighing the factors of I.C.R. 46(h) 
because it did not act within the bounds of its discretion and failed to provide 
reasoning to support its decision 
Idaho statute allows the COUli latitude in determining "if it appears justice so requires" for 
bail to be exonerated LC. § 19-2919. The rule applied to see if justice requires an exoneration is 
LC.R. 46(h), which provides the following: 
"In ruling upon such a motion, the court shall consider all relevant factors, which may include but 
not be limited to the following: 
(A) the willfulness of the defendant's violation of the obligation to appear; 
(B) the participation of the person posting bail in locating and apprehending the defendant; 
(C) the costs, inconvenience, and prejudice suffered by the state as a result of the defendant's 
violation of the obligation to appear; 
(D) any intangible costs; 
(E) the public's interest in insuring a defendant's appearance; 
(F) any mitigating factors; 
(0) whether the state exhibited any actual interest in regaining custody of the defendant through 
prompt efforts to extradite him; 
(H) whether the bonding company has attempted to assist or persuade the defendant to expedite 
his return to Idaho by exercising his rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Idaho 
Code § 19-5001 et seq.; and 
(I) the need to deter the defendant and others from future violations." I.C.R. 46(h)(1)(A)-(I). 
The rule is not exhaustive and other factors may be considered if proper. Id. The court 
may also forfeit the bail in part, or in whole. I.C.R. 46(h)(2). Factors (H) and (I) are not 
applicable in this case. In this instance, the court properly stated its discretion on whether or not 
to exonerate bail. However, it did not act within the bounds of the discretion afforded to it and 
also failed to properly describe the reasons that lead to its decision. 
As to the willfulness in of the defendant to not show up in subsection (A), Big Dawg 
agrees there was a wilful nonappearance and no justifiable excuse has been rendered. 
In subsection (B), the court did not properly weigh the fact that Big Dawg persistently 
acted to locate and apprehend the defendant. As described supra, Mr. Elliott constantly tracked 
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1 the defendant and could have physically apprehended her, but could not legally apprehend her. 
2 The delay by the District Court made it impossible for Big Dawg to actually satisfy subsection 
3 (B), so this factor should be weighted more heavily than the rest. 
4 The prejudice to the state in subsection (C) is fairly obvious in that the defendant is not 
5 physically present for justice to be administered conveniently. However, the state has no real 
6 costs suffered here and any costs, convenience, or prejudice endured was a product of its own 
7 making. Thus, subsection (C) should be weighed against the state. 
8 The District Court also erred in stating there are no intangible costs under subsection (D). 
9 While it is unclear precisely what an "intangible cost" would be, the inclination would be to 
10 consider nonmonetary damages to the bail bond system. As already stated, the bail bond system 
11 requires clear and consistent guidelines to operate properly. The intangible cost here would be a 
12 lack of faith in the system to operate predictably and would promote a lack of oversight and 
13 inefficiency within the court system. Even if this fact would not fit within subsection (D), it 
14 would fall under a mitigating factor in subsection (F). 
15 The District Court also did not logically weigh subsection (E) because it understated the 
16 public's interest in having a defendant charged of their third DUI present at court. The District 
17 Court opined that this case was a "routine felony DUI" and in reality, it was the defendant's third 
18 DUI. The public has a profound and vested interest in making sure that a defendant who routinely 
19 drives while intoxicated is brought to court. The practical import of such a defendant absconding 
20 is that the defendant is likely to be on the road while intoxicated yet again. Obviously, the public 
21 interest is vast in not being on the road with an extremely intoxicated driver and that interest not 
22 being protected could literally become fatal. Thus, the public interest factor should have been 
23 weighed much more heavily. 
24 As for other mitigating factors in subsection (F), there are several. First, the delay in the 
25 issuance of the warrant and delivery to the sheriff is essentially dispositive here. There was 
26 literally nothing else Big Dawg could have done to apprehend the defendant before the warrant 
27 was signed and active. Second, Big Dawg spent considerable effort, time, and money into finding 
28 the defendant, only to see such efforts become unsuccessful. Third, Mr. Elliott would have 
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1 presumably been arrested for kidnapping had he proceeded to arrest the defendant because there 
2 was no active warrant. It is unreasonable to require Big Dawg to commit a crime in order to 
3 produce the defendant's presence in court. 
4 Also, the court did not properly analyze the factors because it did not explain its decision 
5 through the exercise of reason and instead gave a bare, conclusory analysis. If the court is to 
6 exercise its discretion to only partially exonerate the bail, it must do so by more thoroughly 
7 explaining its rationale in how it detennined the exoneration amount. Simply stated, the court did 
8 not adequately explain its decision here. 
9 Considering that the defendant is extremely unlikely to be procured at this point, 
10 exonerating the bond does not actually let the defendant off the hook as the trial court contends. 
11 Instead, Big Dawg is punished for circumstances outside its control, all the while the defendant 
12 remains unaffected by the decision since her location is unknown at this time. Further, ifthe 
13 defendant is apprehended, her subsequent bail will be higher and she will then be punished. 
14 Finally, the state still has the ability to procure the defendant through arrest (if defendant is found) 
15 and sate its interest in bringing the defendant into court. 
16 C. Justice would be best served to fully exonerate the bail because it would increase 
17 the odds of the defendant showing up to court in the future, give predictability in 
18 the industry, ensure proper oversight, enforce the specific language of the statute, 
19 and give recourse to the individual Appellant 
20 Aside from the court abusing their discretion in applying LC.R. 46(h), justice would be 
21 best served here by fully exonerating the bail here for numerous reasons. First, fully exonerating 
22 the bond would place an impetus on the courts to prioritize the immediate issuance of a warrant. 
23 The courts will then know that immediately truly means immediately and will thus have guidance 
24 on what is expected on their end of the bargain. By requiring urgent action, bondsmen will 
25 consequently be enabled to act quicker, which will increase the odds of getting the defendant in 
26 the court room. 
27 Additionally, fully exonerating the bond will give the bondsmen industry more 
28 predicatability in how the process will work. Bondsmen will have a more clear timeframe as to 
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1 when they can expect a warrant to go active after a nonappearance. Further, the intent ofthe 
2 legislature will be fulfilled because the precise and actual use of the word "immediate" will have 
3 been satisfied. 
4 Finally, a full exoneration vindicates the individual appellant here and gives them proper 
5 recourse for the state failing to fulfill its end of the bargain. Thus, not only will there be 
6 prospective justice via clear precedent, the individual will be properly dealt with. 
7 CONCLUSION 
8 Big Dawg has been footed a tab that is in no way a product oftheir own making. Big 
9 Dawg was vigilant in their search for the defendant and upheld their end of the bargain with the 
10 state to compel the cooperation from the defendant. However, the delay between the 
11 nonappearance and the issuance of a warrant was impermissible and in violation of the statutory 
12 mandate to immediately do so. 
13 The violation of the statutes explicit and unambiguous terms constituted a breach of 
14 contract because the statute stands as an express contingency term in the contract for bail. Due to 
15 the breach, Big Dawg suffered damages that were not sufficiently remedied by the District Court. 
16 Because the damages stemmed from contract law, contractual remedies are available. The proper 
17 remedy for the breach is to rescind the contract and give full restitution to Big Dawg, which 
18 operates to exonerate the bond. 
19 Even ifI.C.R. 46(h) is applied here, the same result of full exoneration should occur if the 
20 factors are properly weighed. Exoneration of the bond will alert courts that they need to strictly 
21 adhere to their statutory duties regarding forfeiture of bail and issuance of a warrant. Although it 
22 could be argued that in this case the defendant is let offthe hook, this compliance will benefit the 
23 public interest in increasing the odds that the defendant will be in court, help give the courts clear 
24 guidance on what is expected on their behalf, and help bondsmen perform their end of the 
25 contract. Most importantly, the state's material breach of the terms of the statute should be an 
26 overriding mitigating factor that fully exonerates the bond. 
27 To permit the delay that occurred in this case not only punished the Appellant at hand for 
28 circumstances beyond his control, but it also voids the statute of its unambiguous language 
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1 because the court did not immediately see to the requirements as stated by the legislature. Further, 
2 allowing the delay invites future oversight by the courts and will give hesitancy to bondsmen in 
3 relying on the court to perfonn their statutory mandate. 
4 Due to all the aforementioned reasons, the Court should fully exonerate the bail amount 
5 because of the material breach of contract. In the alternative, the Court should exonerate the bail 
6 well in excess of the $29,000 granted by the District Court. 
7 
8 
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